I don’t think that working for survival of your own species can’t be noble. True, knowingly sacrificing for another species may be more noble in this case, but it seems to me it’s a matter of degree rather than extremes.

However, Christian, you’ve made an excellent argument for why the voiceover version speaks more strongly to you. Honestly, it does to me too, but I still appreciate how much darker the director’s cut is—for the exact same reasons you mention.

I don’t think that working for survival of your own species can’t be noble. True, knowingly sacrificing for another species may be more noble in this case, but it seems to me it’s a matter of degree rather than extremes.

However, Christian, you’ve made an excellent argument for why the voiceover version speaks more strongly to you. Honestly, it does to me too, but I still appreciate how much darker the director’s cut is—for the exact same reasons you mention.

Case in point Pris and the scientist and Hauer’s character and Deckert. If Deckert is a replicant then the only emotion/empathy Hauer’s character feels is the survival of species. The same goes for Deckert. If on the other hand they are known different “entities” it is a greater sacrifice.

To make artiface human is as old as Pygmalian (Ovid), even older, but I still find it less of a moral sacrifice if Deckert is a replicant. Someday I will have to look up my Philosophy paper on known versus unknown moral actions.

The other question, whether replicants are human in spirit or morality, is the key question that Scott added to the equation (in all versions). Dick focused on how when it came to desire for survival the replicants were superior to humans (they still lacked morality), but the humans had also lost any sense of empathy or emotional control. In fact, my favorite scenes in the book focus on the religion of empathy “exercise routine.”

As I believe though, whether Deckert is a pure strain human does matter when judging his moral actions. If he is sacrificing for a person of another species it is noble, if he is focusing on mere survival of the species then it is Hobbesian/biological imperative. From a deontological or a teleological presentation of morality (both of which I find satisfying) the ends and means must match for something to be moral. It is only in the “modern” perspective that ends has greater import than means.

Case in point Pris and the scientist and Hauer’s character and Deckert. If Deckert is a replicant then the only emotion/empathy Hauer’s character feels is the survival of species. The same goes for Deckert. If on the other hand they are known different “entities” it is a greater sacrifice.

To make artiface human is as old as Pygmalian (Ovid), even older, but I still find it less of a moral sacrifice if Deckert is a replicant. Someday I will have to look up my Philosophy paper on known versus unknown moral actions.

The other question, whether replicants are human in spirit or morality, is the key question that Scott added to the equation (in all versions). Dick focused on how when it came to desire for survival the replicants were superior to humans (they still lacked morality), but the humans had also lost any sense of empathy or emotional control. In fact, my favorite scenes in the book focus on the religion of empathy “exercise routine.”

As I believe though, whether Deckert is a pure strain human does matter when judging his moral actions. If he is sacrificing for a person of another species it is noble, if he is focusing on mere survival of the species then it is Hobbesian/biological imperative. From a deontological or a teleological presentation of morality (both of which I find satisfying) the ends and means must match for something to be moral. It is only in the “modern” perspective that ends has greater import than means.

Your point about Blade Runner is dead on. All the versions of the movie center on the question of the nature of humanity and whether something that fakes it well enough can be considered ontologically to be the thing it simulates. (The film AI tackled this same question.) What side of that issue you wish to take probably colors your perceptions of the various versions of the film as much as anything.

Your point about Blade Runner is dead on. All the versions of the movie center on the question of the nature of humanity and whether something that fakes it well enough can be considered ontologically to be the thing it simulates. (The film AI tackled this same question.) What side of that issue you wish to take probably colors your perceptions of the various versions of the film as much as anything.

I’m in the director’s cut camp on Blade Runner, although I have a fondness for the theatrical cut. I can understand how many, including Ford, consider the theatrical more heroic, but if you accept that replicants are also human in spirit or morality, it really doesn’t matter whether he’s pure strain human. In fact, it strikes me as more poignant if he isn’t.

I’m in the director’s cut camp on Blade Runner, although I have a fondness for the theatrical cut. I can understand how many, including Ford, consider the theatrical more heroic, but if you accept that replicants are also human in spirit or morality, it really doesn’t matter whether he’s pure strain human. In fact, it strikes me as more poignant if he isn’t.